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INTRODUCTION
T he Supreme Court's current liberal construction of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause is grounded in more than a century
of rulings in which the Court often has judged governmental regula-
tion inflicting a burden or harm on private property to be a compensa-
ble taking. Yet, to date, the Supreme Court has not formulated an
explicit rule to determine the precise point at which governmental
regulation becomes a "taking." The dissenting Justices in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council' maintained that the Court drafted a new regulatory takings
doctrine2 when it ruled that total regulatory takings require compen-
sation.3 If, indeed, the Supreme Court has charted a new course in
applying the Takings Clause to governmental regulation, the propo-
nents of historical preservation must assess how the new principles
relate to preservation laws. However, given the recent decisions of
the Supreme Court,4 which reveal the diversity among members of the
Court over the proper application of the Takings Clause to govern-
mental regulation, the position of historical preservation regulation
in regulatory takings jurisprudence is confusing at best.6
* Robert H. Bean Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, Lub-
bock, Tex.; J.D., University of Texas; Ph.D., Texas Tech University.
1. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
2. Id. at 2917. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun described what he
deemed to be the new doctrine as "sweeping," "misguided and unsupported." Id. He
found "no clear and accepted 'historical compact' or 'understanding of our citizens'
justifying" the so-called "new taking doctrine." Id. Justice Blackmun contended that
the majority in Lucas attempted "to package the law of two incompatible eras and
peddle it as historical fact." Id. The majority, on the other hand, apparently thought
its opinion was based on principles that had been "frequently expressed" by the Court
in past decisions. Id. at 2895.
3. Id at 2899.
4. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
5. For example, Dolan was a 5-4 decision.
6. The Court's recent takings decisions, cited above, raise the issue of whether
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), discussed in
notes 82-96 and 224-27 and accompanying text, is still good law. In Lucas, Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, termed the "calculus" used in Penn Central to ex-
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As the Court conceded in Lucas, its decisions have generally "of-
fered little insight" into when a regulation has gone "too far" and has
become a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment.7 The Court also ac-
knowledged that its application of the Takings Clause to "harm
preventing" and "benefit conferring" regulations had been inconsis-
tent in its previous decisions.' If the Court has difficulty in applying
the Takings Clause to governmental regulation generally, there un-
doubtedly will be a great deal of perplexity in applying its recent rul-
ings to historical preservation regulation, because the categorization
of this form of regulation is itself uncertain. 9
The Lucas Court held that when an owner of property "has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses" of his or her
property, the owner has suffered a "taking." 10 Apparently, then, there
would be a compensable "taking" if historical preservation laws bur-
den private property to the extent that a property owner is denied all
economically beneficial or productive use of his or her property. But
how does one determine when the property owner has been denied
amine the diminution in value of private property caused by New York's preservation
law to be "extreme" and "unsupportable." 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. Scalia also cited the
"uncertainty regarding the composition" of Penn Central's "'deprivation' fraction,"
the denominator of which was the claimant's other property holdings in the vicinity,
as the reason for, what it termed, "the inconsistent pronouncements of the Court."
Id.
7. Id at 2893.
8. Id. at 2897-98 (commenting that the distinction is often "in the eye of the
beholder").
9. In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992), the
Washington Supreme Court characterized preservation ordinances as furthering cul-
tural and aesthetic interests, but not protecting public health or safety. Id. at 185. It
held that a city's "interest in preservation of aesthetic and historic structures is not
compelling." Id. Presumably, in this context, preservation laws do not represent a
typical exercise of the police power. On the other hand, numerous other courts have
categorized regulations protecting historical properties to be valid exercises of the
police power. See, e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm'n, 368 A.2d 163
(Conn. 1976); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953); In re Opinion of
Justices to Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955); Town of Deering ex rel. Bittenbender
v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232 (N.H. 1964); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389
P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968); Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 273 N:Y.S.2d
848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); A-S-P Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C.
1979). But see Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305, 311
(N.Y. 1974) (holding a portion of a city's landmarks preservation law not to be a valid
exercise of the city's police power); State v. Seattle, 615 P.2d 461 (Wash. 1980) (hold-
ing that a city's police power did not extend to the designation of state-owned build-
ings as landmarks).
In Maher v. City of New Orleans, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the police power
includes more "subtle and ephemeral societal interests" than those that are "solely
economic or directed at health and safety in their narrowest senses." 516 F.2d at
1060. The opinion continued, "[i]t is within the domain of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean,
well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Id. at 1060-61.
10. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
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"all economically beneficial or productive use" of such property? The
Court admitted in Lucas that the "property interest" against which
the loss of value is measured is unclear." In addition, what if the
burden to the "property interest," once it is defined, is substantial, but
not total? While the Court in Lucas did not rule that "substantial"
deprivations of use of private property are also compensable takings,
the import of its decision clearly advances such an interpretation.
In the Court's most recent takings decision, Dolan v. City of
Tigard,2 the Court decided that there must be a "rough proportional-
ity" between a "legitimate state interest" and the governmental re-
striction in question. 13 This holding supports an inference at least that
the Court would rule, in some cases, that "substantial" regulatory dep-
rivations may be compensable takings.
The question arises whether the current decisions of the Supreme
Court are novel interpretations of the Takings Clause, which would
call into question previous regulatory takings jurisprudence, or
whether the Court's present liberal interpretation of the Takings
Clause is grounded in history and, therefore, not a threat to preserva-
tion laws.
While the Supreme Court's decisions in Lucas and Dolan were pur-
portedly based upon the Court's takings decisions over a span of "70-
odd years,"' 4 its findings raise questions whether the Court has indeed
adopted a more expansive course in its application of the Takings
Clause to governmental regulations-a posture, for example, that will
ultimately have a profound impact on historical preservation laws. An
increasingly liberal interpretation of the Takings Clause necessitates
an increasingly limited endorsement of governmental regulation. Un-
questionably, a pronouncement that exercise of the "police power"
triggers the Takings Clause, which would then require a governmental
entity to assess the cost of every regulation to private interests, leaves
doubt that the Takings Clause and a state's police power can continue
to coexist without conflict. Some fear that the Supreme Court's lib-
eral interpretation of the Takings Clause could cause governmental
11. For example, the Court commented:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation
as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial
use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has
suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Id. at 2894 n.7. The Court pointed to the "uncertainty regarding the composition of
the denominator" in its "deprivation" fraction as the reason the Court had produced
inconsistent pronouncements in takings cases. Id.
12. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
13. Id at 2319-20. The Court concluded that no "precise mathematical calculation
is required," but ruled that a governmental entity "must make some sort of individu-
alized determination" that its restriction is related "both in nature and extent to the
impact" of the condition. Id.
14. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
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regulation to come to a screeching halt. One important regulatory
zone, historical preservation law, is an area of concern."5
This Article addresses the conflict between governmental regula-
tion to preserve cultural, architectural, or historical aspects of prop-
erty and the Takings Clause. Part I of this Article surveys and
analyzes Supreme Court decisions spanning more than a century,
from Justice Strong's 1879 opinion in Transportation Co. v. Chicago6
to Chief Justice Rehnquist's 1994 opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard,7
to distill some principles that can be used to ascertain when a govern-
mental regulation becomes a compensable "taking." Part II reviews
lower court decisions and addresses historical protection laws as they
relate to, or conflict with, the Takings Clause. Part III attempts to
formulate some guidelines that preservationists and governmental of-
ficials can use in determining if, or when, historical preservation regu-
lation will presently be deemed a compensable taking. This Article
concludes that while the Supreme Court's recent takings decisions
may constrain historic preservation efforts by requiring compensation
in some cases, comprehensive preservation programs, such as zoning
regulations, should continue to survive Takings challenges. With re-
spect to those isolated instances in which specific properties are sin-
gled out and private use of the property is severely curtailed, a
recognition that owners are entitled to compensation may cause pri-
vate interests to have a more positive, and perhaps a more active, role
in the preservation movement.
I. A HISTORY OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE FROM A SUPREME
COURT PERSPECrIVE
Early constitutional theorists believed that the Takings Clause did
not embrace governmental regulation of property.' 8 The Supreme
Court has concluded that the Takings Clause was originally conceived
of as reaching only "direct appropriation" of property or the "func-
tional equivalent of a 'practical ouster' of the owner's possession."' 9
15. For example, must courts reconsider their rulings in more recent decisions in-
volving historical preservation laws? See, e.g., Mayes v. City of Dallas, 747 F.2d 323
(5th Cir. 1984) (municipality's regulation of historical private property not a compen-
sable taking); Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905
(1991) (application of city landmark law to historical church not a compensable taking
and not a violation of the free exercise of religion clause); First Covenant Church v.
City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992) (application of landmark law to historical
church violated church's free exercise of religion).
16. 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
17. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
18. See discussion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2900 (1992).
19. See Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871). See discussion in Lucas, 112 S.
Ct. at 2892.
In 1879, in Transportation Co. v. Chicago,2" the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that in the Magna Carta and in restrictions found in every
state constitution, "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation being made."'" But members of the Court
also perceived that "acts done in proper exercise of governmental
powers and not directly encroaching upon private property" should
not be takings "within the meaning of the constitutional provisions. '"22
Thus, in 1887, in Mugler v. Kansas,23 the Court upheld an ordinance
effectively prohibiting operation of a previously lawful brewery.
Although the effect of the ordinance was to render the brewery value-
less as property, the Court did not deem the regulation to be a taking
or appropriation of property. The Court explicitly upheld the right of
local governments to prohibit uses of property that were "injurious to
the health, morals, or safety of a community. '24 The theory evolved
that harm-preventing regulation, which, in effect, permitted local gov-
ernments to prohibit public nuisances, would not be compensable tak-
ings. Still, in its 1893 decision in Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States,2 5 the Supreme Court cautioned that "constitutional pro-
visions for the security of person and property should be liberally con-
strued," because, according to the Court, a "close and literal
construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual
depreciation of the rights of the citizen."26
In Monongahela, the Supreme Court declared that the Takings
Clause "reaches back" of all "unalienable rights" set forth in the Bill
of Rights.27 According to the Court, the first ten amendments
are in the nature of a bill of rights and were adopted in order to
quiet the apprehension of many that without some declaration of
rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess,
the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property
which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be
unalienable rights.28
20. 99 U.S. 635 (1879).
21. Id. at 642.
22. Id In Transportation Co., the city's improvement of its highways had ob-
structed a stream that caused damage to a landowner's property. The Court ruled
that the city was not required to compensate the property owner. However, it also
commented that "acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not
directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its
use, are universally held not to be a taking." Id. at 642. The Court pointed out that
there was no "physical invasion of the real estate of the private owner," nor a "practi-
cal ouster of his possession." Id.
23. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
24. Id. at 669. See discussion in Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion in Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
26. Id at 325.
27. Id at 324.
28. Id.
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The Supreme Court declared that this "natural equity" was incident to
the government's exercise of its eminent domain power.2 9 The Court
unequivocally concluded in Monongahela that "the one is so in-
separably connected with the other that they may be said to exist, not
as separate and distinct principles, but as parts of one and the same
principle."3"
The following year, in Lawton v. Steele,3' the Court determined that
a state could "interpose" its authority on behalf of the public only if it
appeared that the interests of the public required such interference,
the means were reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that
purpose, and the means were not unduly oppressive upon individu-
als.32 In 1897, in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chi-
cago,3 the Court declared that the Fifth Amendment's just
compensation requirement is " 'an affirmance of a great doctrine es-
tablished by the common law for the protection of private prop-
erty.' " As the Court then maintained, "'in a free government,
almost all other rights would become worthless if the government pos-
sessed an uncontrollable power over the private fortune of every
citizen.' ,35
Even as the Supreme Court announced its position that a govern-
mental taking of property for public use was inseparable from the re-
quirement of just compensation to the property owner, and affirmed
that it would liberally construe the requirement of payment of just
compensation, governmental regulations enacted to protect the safety
of lives and property continued to present a dilemma for the Court.
In 1915, in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,3 the Court held that an ordinance
prohibiting brickmaking was not unconstitutional even though the
plaintiff had alleged that the ordinance rendered his property value-
less because it could only be used as a brickyard. 37 The Court rea-
soned that, as cities progressed, private interests that were "in the way
... must yield to the good of the community. ' 38 It later concluded, in
29. Id. at 325.
30. Id
31. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
32. Id at 137.
33. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
34. Id. at 236 (quoting 2 STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES *1790).
35. Id The Court in Chicago stated that "it is not due process of law if provision
be not made for compensation." Id. The Court asserted that notice to an owner "to
appear in some judicial tribunal and show cause why his property shall not be taken
for public use without compensation would be a mockery of justice." Id.
36. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
37. Id. at 405. Although not a takings case per se, the Court's opinion in
Hadacheck is significant in that it follows the earlier Mugler decision wherein the
Court recognized a nuisance abatement qualification to the Takings Clause. The
Court in Hadacheck recognized a police power qualification to an otherwise protected
property right that evolved into the police power exception to the Takings Clause.
38. Id. at 410.
1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,39 that "[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law."40
In Mahon, the Court maintained it had been "long recognized" that
"some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield
to the police power."41 But the Court also decided the "implied limi-
tation must have its limits or the contract and due process clauses are
gone."42 The Court decided that "[o]ne fact for consideration in de-
termining such limits is the extent of the diminution."43 According to
the Court, when the diminution has reached a "certain magnitude, in
most, if not in all cases, there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act." 44
The Court in Mahon expressed concern about the "natural ten-
dency of human nature" to extend the police power qualification to
otherwise protected private property rights.4 If this occurred "more
and more," private property would, in the Court's view, eventually
disappear. 46 However, the Court discounted this possibility, stating
that the Constitution prevents such a result.47 The Court commented,
"[w]e are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change."'
Thus, in and after Mahon, the Court had confirmed that the Takings
Clause encompassed "regulatory as well as physical deprivations."
4 9
Still, early Supreme Court decisions recognized that comprehensive
zoning laws were not compensable takings. In 1926, in Village of Eu-
clid v. Ambler Realty Co. 50 the Court noted that problems, relating to
a changing, more urban, society, had developed and would require,
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. Id at 413.
41. Id
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 415.
46. Id
47. Id. The Court noted the general rule that, while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Id.
48. Id. at 416.
49. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2900 n.15 (1992); Id.
at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, there is some indication that the Court, as
early as 1922 in Mahon, determined that a total diminution of a private citizen's prop-
erty was a compensable taking regardless of the importance of the public purpose for
which the property was taken. There, the Court stated that when the diminution in
value to private property reaches a certain magnitude, "in most if not all cases, there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act." Mahon,
260 U.S. at 413.
50. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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and "continue to require," additional restrictions on use of land.5' In
Euclid, the Court asserted that governmental regulations, such as zon-
ing restrictions and traffic restrictions, which would have been re-
jected as "arbitrary and oppressive" half a century earlier, were
justified based on the needs of a changing society.52 The Court ruled
that such regulations must find justification in the government's police
power "asserted for the public welfare."53 The Court recommended
that courts consult nuisance law to determine whether the regulations
were justifiable.54
In 1928, in Miller v. Schoene,55 the Court held that an order to cut
down trees to prevent the spread of plant disease was a constitutional
exercise of the police power. In so holding, the Miller Court ruled
that a government's decision to destroy one class of property rather
than another, based on which property was more valuable to the pub-
lic, was permissible. 56 However, in 1933, in Jacobs v. United States,57
the Court ruled that the construction of a dam that caused an increase
in the occasional flooding of lands required the federal government to
pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment.58 Two years later,
in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,59 the Court held that
a mortgagee's lien was a property interest within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, and that when a mortgagee's security interest is
taken to relieve "the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must
be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation,
the burden of the relief afforded in the public interest may be borne
by the public."6°
51. Id. at 386-87.
52. Id at 387.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
56. Id. at 280.
57. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
58. Id at 16. The Court commented that the fact that condemnation proceedings
were not instituted, but rather that the owners asserted their rights in a suit, did not
change the "essential nature of the claim." Id. The Court stated that the "form of the
remedy did not qualify the right." Id. According to the Court, because the remedy
rested upon the Fifth Amendment, statutory recognition was not necessary. The
Court noted that such "suits were founded upon the Constitution of the United
States." Id. The Court also maintained that the amount recoverable was "just com-
pensation, not inadequate compensation." Id The Court opined that "just compen-
sation" was "comprehensive" and "included all the elements." Id. at 17. It decided
that compensation should include interest when interest or its equivalent should be
part of the compensation. Id. According to the Court, "interest at a proper rate 'is a
good measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.'" Id (quoting Sea-
board Air Line R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923)).
59. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
60. Id at 602.
In 1945, in United States v. Willow River Power Co.,61 the Court
declared that "not all economic interests are 'property rights.' "62 It
ruled that "only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have
the law back of them, and only when they are so recognized may the
judiciary compel others to forbear from interfering with them or to
compensate for their invasion."63 Even so, the following year, in
United States v. Causby,6 the Court decided that military aircraft fly-
ing at a low level over private property would constitute a compensa-
ble taking if the flights rendered the property uninhabitable.65
The Court has also considered wartime takings claims. In 1951, in
United States v. Pewee Coal Co.,66 the Court ruled that the govern-
ment's seizure and operation of a coal mine to prevent a national
strike of coal miners constituted a taking.67 The Court concluded that
because there had been an "actual taking of possession, and control,"
the taking was as clear as if the government had held full title and
ownership.68 But in 1958, in United States V. Central Eureka Mining
Co.,69 the Court found that no taking occurred when the government
issued a wartime order requiring nonessential gold mines to cease op-
erations to conserve equipment and manpower for use in mines more
essential to the war effort. In that case, the Court concluded that the
government did not "occupy, use, or in any manner take physical pos-
session of the gold mines or of the equipment connected with them."7
61. 324 U.S. 499 (1945).
62. Id. at 502. The claimant's alleged property rights, were riparian rights in a
flowing stream. The government had completed a dam that created a pool extending
upstream beyond the claimant's plant. The dam diminished the claimant's plant ca-
pacity to produce electric energy. Id. at 501-04.
63. Id.
64. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
65. Id. at 261. The Court stated that "[i]f, by reason of the frequency and altitude
of flights, [owners] could not use.., land for any purpose, their loss would be com-
plete." Id. According to the Court in Causby, it would be as complete as if the [gov-
ernment] had "entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of
it." Id. The Court decided there would be a taking in these circumstances because
the owner's "beneficial ownership ... would be destroyed." Id. at 262. The Court
determined that the land would have, been "appropriated as directly and completely
as if it were used for runways themselves." Id. The Court asserted that a landowner
owns "at least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in
connection with the land." Id. at 264. The Court was not, concerned that a landowner
does not occupy that space. The Court did state, however,.that flights over private
lands are not takings "unless they are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of land." Id. at 266. The Court
concluded that the "owner's loss, not the taker's gain," was the measure of the value
of the property taken. Id. at 261.
66. 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 116.
69. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
70. Id. at 165-66. The Court reasoned that the temporary, though severe, restric-
tion on mine usage was justified by the exigency of war.
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These early Supreme Court decisions illustrate that, in scrutinizing
governmental regulation under the Takings Clause, the Court recog-
nized a distinction between "a permanent physical occupation, a phys-
ical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely
restrict[ed] the use of property. ' 71 As to those regulations which ap-
propriated private property, the Court generally held that the Fifth
Amendment required compensation.
In 1960, in Armstrong v. United States,72 the Court determined that
materialmen's liens were property interests within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, and that the Fifth Amendment required the gov-
ernment to pay the lienholder when it destroyed the value of the
lienholder's security interest by acquiring that security interest.73 The
Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment provides a constitutional
safety net, declaring, "[t]he Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to
bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole." 74
However, in 1962, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,75 the Court
reaffirmed that governmental regulation that is a valid exercise of the
police power does not constitute a compensable taking.76 The Court
reasoned that a prohibition upon the use of land "for purposes that
are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals,
or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a
taking ... for the public benefit. '77 The Court qualified this ruling
with the recognition that "governmental action in the form of regula-
tion cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which constitution-
ally requires compensation, '7 s but also noted that there was "no set
formula to determine where regulation ends and taking begins. 79
In United States v. Fuller,0 the Court declared that "[t]he constitu-
tional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from
the basic equitable principles of fairness, as it does from technical con-
71. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430-31 (1982).
72. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
73. Id. at 48-49.
74. 1& at 49.
75. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
76. Id. at 593 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
77. Id. The Court concluded that the power of a state to prohibit certain uses
could not be burdened with a condition that the state be required to compensate
owners "for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted,
by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community." Id.
78. Id. at 594.
79. Id. The Court pointed out that the term "police power". "connotes the time-
tested conceptional limit of public encroachment upon private interests." Id. It noted
that except for a "substitution of the familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' the Court
has generally refrained from announcing any specific criteria.". Id.
80. 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
cepts of property law."'" This "fairness" factor was a consideration
five years later, in 1978, when the Court in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City,82 reviewed, for the first and only time, the
application of the Takings Clause to historical preservation laws.
In Penn Central, the Court weighed the requirement of "fairness" to
a property owner with what it termed "nationwide legislative efforts"
to preserve buildings and areas with historic or aesthetic importance.83
The Court stated that the "question of what constitutes a 'taking' for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of con-
siderable difficulty." 84 It noted that while it had "recognized that the
'Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is] designed to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,' "85 it
had been "unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when
'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain dispro-
portionately concentrated on a few persons." 86 The Court pointed to
zoning laws and ordinances prohibiting "particular contemplated uses
of land" where "health, safety, morals, or general welfare" would be
promoted.87 Thus, it concluded that "in a wide variety of contexts,
[the] government may execute laws or programs that adversely affect
recognized economic values" without its action constituting a taking.88
In Penn Central, the. Supreme Court ruled that New York's
landmarks law was not a "taking" when its application had the effect
of precluding the Penn Central Transportation Company from build-
ing a skyscraper atop Grand Central Terminal. The Court decided
that a determination of what constitutes a taking is "essentially" an
"ad hoc, factual inquir[y]," 89 but pointed-out several factors "that
have particular significance."9
One important factor the Court listed was "character of the govern-
mental action." 91 The Court also declared that a " 'taking' may more
readily be found when interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion by government." 9z The Court cited the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the property owner and "particu-
larly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
81. Id. at 490.
82. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
83. Id. at 107-08.
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id. at 123-24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (al-
teration in original).
86. Id (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
87. Id. at 125.
88. Id at 124.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id.
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investment-backed expectations," as relevant considerations.93 The
Court resolved the "fairness" issue by concluding that the New York
law did not "interfere in any way with the present uses of the Termi-
nal."'94 The Court decided that designation of the Terminal as a
landmark "not only permits but contemplates that [its owners] may
continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the past
65 years." 95 The Court reasoned there was no taking because restric-
tions on use of the property were "substantially related to the promo-
tion of the general welfare."'
Although the Supreme Court ruled in Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead97 that there is no set formula for determining when governmen-
tal regulation constitutes a taking, and ruled in Penn Central that the
determination is basically an "ad hoc, factual inquiry, '98 the Court has
generally concluded that physical invasions of private property by
governmental entities constitute compensable takings.
In 1979, in Andrus v. Allard,' the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a prohibition on the sale of eagle feathers was a
taking as applied to bird artifacts. 100 The Court determined that a
compensable taking had not occurred because governmental regula-
tions prohibiting such sales "do not compel the surrender of the arti-
facts" and cause no "physical invasion or restraint upon them." 101
That same year, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, °2 the Court em-
phasized that physical invasion is a government intrusion of an unusu-
ally serious character,0 3 and ruled that when a former private pond
93. Id.
94. Id. at 136.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 138. The Court concluded that the restrictions permitted "reasonable
beneficial use" of the landmark and also afforded property owners opportunities "fur-
ther to enhance not only the Terminal site property but also other properties." Id.
97. 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
98. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
99. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
100. Id. In Andrus, the Court reviewed the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 6681
(1940), and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1918), both conser-
vation statutes designed to prevent the destruction of certain species of birds, to de-
termine whether governmental regulation through such statutes was a compensable
taking. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66. The Eagle Protection Act prohibits the taking,
possession, sale, purchase, transport, export, or import of any part of an eagle, and
applies whether an eagle is dead or alive. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a). The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act makes it unlawful to pursue, capture, kill, purchase, transport, import, or
carry any migratory bird that is included in certain treaties with other countries. 16
U.S.C. § 703.
101. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-66. The Court pointed out that the owners of such
feathers could "possess and transport their property" and could "donate or devise the
protected birds." It determined that "loss of future profits" was "a slender reed upon
which to rest a takings claim." Id. at 66. However, the Court's statement is question-
able since the Eagle Protection Act also proscribes both possession and transport of
any part of an eagle, whether the eagle is dead or alive. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a).
102. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
103. Id. at 180.
became navigable water subject to regulation by the Army Corps of
Engineers, the owner of the pond suffered a "taking.' 10 4 The Court
was concerned that the government was not just "exercising its regula-
tory power in a manner that [would] cause an insubstantial devalua-
tion" of private property; rather, the Court reasoned that the
government's "imposition of the navigational servitude" would result
in an "actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina."' 5 The
Court stated that "even if the government physically invades only an
easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.' 0 6
In 1980, the Supreme Court failed to find a compensable taking in
two cases because there was not a physical invasion by the govern-
ment. In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 107 the Supreme Court stated that
the application of a general zoning law to particular property "effects
a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land." 0 8 The Court also reiterated its position that "no precise rule
determines when property has been taken," but concluded that the
question "necessarily requires a weighing of private and public inter-
ests."' 0 9 In ruling that the zoning ordinances "substantially ad-
vance[d] legitimate governmental goals," the Court found the zoning
regulations to be valid exercises of the City's police power to protect
its residents from the "ill effects of urbanization. '"1 0 The Court rea-
soned that zoning regulations do not "extinguish a fundamental attri-
bute of ownership.""' It also concluded that the "impact of general
104. Id. at 178. The Court held that a navigable servitude is "not a blanket excep-
tion to the Takings Clause." Id. at 172-73. The Court recognized that under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress could assure the publica free right of access to the pond if it
chose, but the Court noted that "whether a statute or regulation went so far as to
amount to a 'Taking' is an entirely separate question." Id. at 174. The Court declared
that the owner of the pond had lost "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right to exclude others." Id.
at 176.
105. Id. at 180. The Court noted that the pond owner had been charging persons an
annual fee to have access to the pond. The Court concluded that the government
could not then make the pond into a public aquatic park "without invoking its emi-
nent domain power and paying just compensation." Id.
106. Id
107. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
108. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 260-61. The Court commented that the determination of whether gov-
ernmental action constitutes a taking is "in essence, a determination that the public at
large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power
in the public interest." Id. at 260. The Court cited its decision in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926), for the proposition that zoning laws
are "facially constitutional" because they bear "a substantial relationship to the pub-
lic welfare, and their enactment inflict[s] no irreparable injury upon the landowner."
Agins, 447 U.S. at 261.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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land-use regulations" do not deny landowners the " 'justice and fair-
ness' guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.""'
In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, another 1980 ,case, the
Supreme Court held that the government's protection of the exercise
of an individual's free speech rights at a commercial shopping center
was not a "taking" of the owner's property. 113 In PruneYard, the
Court noted that although a solicitor "may have 'physically invaded'
[an owner's] property," the invasion could not be determinative under
the facts of the case. 11 4
In 1982, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,"' the
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a minor, but perma-
nent, physical occupation of an owner's property constituted a taking.
New York law required a landlord to permit a cable television com-
pany to install its cable facilities upon the landlord's property. 16 In
Loretto, the Court reiterated that no "set formula" existed to deter-
mine when governmental regulation is a compensable taking and that
a court must engage in "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."" 7 Still,
the Court decided the inquiry was "not standardless."" 8 It stated that
the economic impact of a regulation, "especially the degree of inter-
ference with investment-backed expectations, is of particular signifi-
cance." 1 9  The Court also referred to the "character of the
governmental action. ' 120 It explained, "[a] 'taking' may more readily
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as
a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.'' 1
The Court acknowledged that substantial regulation of an owner's
use of his or her private property will not be a compensable taking
when it is "deemed necessary to promote the public interest."' 2 2 Nev-
ertheless, the Court emphasized that "a physical intrusion by govern-
112. Id. at 262-63. The Court decided that the zoning ordinance benefitted the
landowner as well as the public by "serving the city's interest in assuring careful and
orderly development of residential property with provision for open-space areas." Id.
at 263. It concluded that in assessing the "fairness" of zoning ordinances, the benefits
must be considered along with any diminution in market value that the landowner
might suffer. Id. at 226.
113. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
114. Id. at 84. Here, the invasion was temporary and limited in nature, being con-
fined to the common areas of a public shopping center. Id. at 83-84.
115. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
116. Id. at 421. The installation occupied portions of the landowner's roof and the
side of her building.
117. Id. at 426 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ment [is] a property restriction of an unusually serious character for
purposes of the Takings Clause."' 23 The Court declared, "[w]hen
faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupa-
tion of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking."'2
Thus, the Court made the clear distinction in Loretto between phys-
ical occupation by the government of private property and mere re-
striction on the use of private property. 2 It also distinguished
between permanent occupation by governmental authorities, even if
they occupy "only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do
not seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of his
land,"' 26 and more temporary invasions that cause consequential
damage.12
7
The Court acknowledged that previous cases subjected physical in-
vasions to a balancing process, but emphasized that those cases "do
not suggest that a permanent physical occupation would ever be ex-
empt from the Takings Clause.' 1 28 It stressed that whether a perma-
nent physical occupation "achieves an important public benefit or has
only minimal economic impact on the owner" is irrelevant in its deter-
mination of whether there has been a taking.' 29 The Court decided
123. Id. The Court stated that it had "long considered" a physical invasion to be a
compensable taking. It decided that its cases "further establish that when the physical
intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has
occurred." l It then commented that in such a case, "'the character of the govern-
ment action' not only is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a
taking but is also determinative." Id.
124. Id. at 427.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 430.
127. Id. at 430-31. With respect to flooding cases, the Court noted that "flooding
must 'constitute an actual, permanent invasion of the land, amounting to an appropri-
ation of, and not merely an injury to, the property. " l at 428 (quoting Sanguinetti
v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149 (1924)).
128. Id. at 432.
129. Id. at 434-35. The Court concluded that a "permanent physical occupation of
another's property ... is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's
property interest." Id. at 435. Borrowing a metaphor from Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979), the Court asserted that the government "does not simply take a single
'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a
slice of every strand." Id. According to the Court, when
the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively de-
stroys each of these rights. First, the owner has no right to possess the occu-
pied space himself, and also has no power to exclude the occupier from
possession and use of the space.... Second, the permanent physical occupa-
tion of property forever denies the owner any power to control the use of
the property; he not only cannot exclude others, but can make no nonposses-
sory use of the property.... Finally, even though the owner may retain the
bare legal right to dispose of the occupied space by transfer or sale, the per-
manent occupation of that space by a stranger will ordinarily empty the right
of any value, since the purchaser will also be unable to make any use of the
property.
Id. at 435-36. The Court also pointed to a special kind of injury when a "stranger
directly invades and occupies the owner's property." Id. at 436. According to the
1995]
800 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
that a permanent invasion is "qualitatively more severe than a regula-
tion of the use of property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative
duties on the owner, since the owner may have no control over the
timing, extent, or nature of the invasion."130 The Court pointed out
that its holding in Loretto was "very narrow.' 13' It stated:
[w]e affirm the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupa-
tion of property is a taking. In such a case, the property owner en-
tertains a historically rooted expectation of compensation, and the
character of the invasion is qualitatively more intrusive than per-
haps any other category of property regulation. We do not, how-
ever, question the equally substantial authority upholding a State's
broad power to impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner's use
of his property.132
Thus, in Loretto, the Court disavowed a "set formula" for determin-
ing when there is a taking, while simultaneously constructing a "rigid
per se takings rule" that a permanent physical occupation authorized
by government is a taking without regard to the public interest it may
serve.
133
In 1986, the Supreme Court again considered the question of when
governmental regulation becomes a taking.'" In Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,'35 the Court reviewed its earlier de-
cisions, spanning sixty-five years, concluding that the "question
depends upon the particular facts."'13 6 In Keystone, the Court reiter-
ated its findings in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n 137 that, while it had "generally been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by govern-
ment,' 38 and would examine the "taking" issue by "engaging in
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, 'x3 it had identified several fac-
tors that "have particular significance."' 4 These factors included "the
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the government
action."' 41
Court, to require an owner to permit another "to exercise complete dominion literally
adds insult to injury." Id.
130. I.
131. Id. at 441.
132. Id.
133. Id,
134. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1986).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 474 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
137. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
138. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-96)(citations
omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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In 1987, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles,142 the Court commented that it had ruled, at least since
1933 in Jacobs v. United States'43 "that claims for just compensation
are grounded in the Constitution itself."'" But the Court also pointed
out that Jacobs "does not stand alone," for, as it has frequently re-
peated, "in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required
by the Constitution."' 45 It reaffirmed its position from earlier cases
that " 'temporary' takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of his
property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which
the Constitution clearly requires compensation."' A majority of
members of the Court were, for the most part, not concerned that its
holding would limit the flexibility of governmental authorities and
land-use planners. The majority announced:
[w]e realize that even our present holding will undoubtedly lessen
to some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and
governing bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use
regulations. But such consequences necessarily flow from any deci-
sion upholding a claim of constitutional right; many of the provi-
sions of the Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and
freedom of governmental authorities, and the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them. As Justice Holmes
aptly noted more than 50 years ago, "a strong public desire to im-
prove the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.'
147
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,48 the Court again ob-
served that "land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substan-
tially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not 'den[y] an
owner economically viable use of his land.' "149 But the Court also
reiterated that a "use restriction may constitute a 'taking' if it is not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government
purpose."' 50 The Court acknowledged that its cases "have not elabo-
rated on the standards for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate
state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and
142. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
143. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
144. First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
145. Id. at 316.
146. Id. at 318.
147. Id. at 321-22 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416(1922)). See discussion supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
148. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
149. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
150. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. RTansp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127
(1978)).
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the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former 'substan-
tially advance' the latter."15'
In his 1992 majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,5 2 Justice Scalia reviewed and summarized the Court's tak-
ings jurisprudence. Justice Scalia concluded that until Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,'53 "it was generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property, or the func-
tional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] posses-
sion.' ",a Moreover, Justice Scalia suggested that considerations in
Mahon "gave birth" to the "oft-cited maxim that 'while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.' ,,155
The Lucas majority assumed that in "70-odd years of succeeding
'regulatory takings' jurisprudence" the Court had described "at least
two discrete categories of regulatory action as compensable without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of
the restraint."156 According to the majority, "regulations that compel
a property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property" and
regulation that "denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land" require compensation. 57 With respect to regulations that
cause an invasion of private property, the Court asserted that "no
matter how minute the intrusion, and no matter how weighty the pub-
lic purpose behind it," compensation had been required. 58 The Court
expressed regret that "the rhetorical force of [its] 'deprivation of all
151. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens voiced his concern that because of
what he termed the "remarkable ruling" in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), "local governments and offi-
cials must pay the price for necessarily vague standards in this area of the law." No-
lan, 483 U.S. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, also dissenting,
expressed "hope" that a "broader vision" would "ultimately prevail," but remarked
that while states "should be afforded considerable latitude in regulating private devel-
opment without fear that their regulatory efforts will often be found to constitute a
taking," regulation that "denies a private property owner the use and enjoyment of
his land" may indeed be a compensable taking. Id at 864 & n.14 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
152. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
153. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
154. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 2893 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The Court stated that its "total taking" inquiry, "will ordinarily entail...
[an] analysis of, among other. things,,the degree of harm to public lands and resources,
or adjacent private property," caused by a landowner's actions. Id. at 2901. It stated
that a state must identify "background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses [the landowner] intends in the circumstances in which the property is
presently found." Id. at 2901-02. According to the Court, "only on this showing can
the State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses, [a regulation] is
taking nothing." Id.
economically feasible use' rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the 'property interest' against which the loss
of value is to be measured."' 5 9
The Court acknowledged that, under certain circumstances, a land-
owner who suffers a 95% loss of property value because of a govern-
ment regulation on the use of such property may not recover
compensation whereas the landowner with a 100% loss would recoverin full.160 Still, the Court considered "that occasional result [to be] no
more straining than the gross disparity between the landowner whose
premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the land-
owner whose property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the
highway (who recovers nothing)." 6'
In Lucas, the Court referred to a "harmful or noxious use" principle
it described as the Court's early attempt to describe "harm prevent-
ing" regulation, which it decided required no compensation to the
property owner.16  The Court preferred to characterize its decisions
that found no taking as having discerned a legitimate state interest
which was advanced by the regulation-for example, the implementa-
tion of a policy "'expected to produce a widespread public benefit
and applicable to all similarly situated property.' "163 The Court also
noted the ease of transition from what it called its "early focus on
control of 'noxious' uses to [its] contemporary understanding of the
broad realm within which government may regulate without compen-
sation," explaining that "the distinction between 'harm-preventing'
and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the
beholder."'"
159. Id at 2894 n.7. The Court opined that the answer to difficult takings questions
"may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's
law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interests in land." Id.
160. Id. at 2895 n.8.
161. Id The majority of the Court believed that regulation that leaves the owner of
land without economically beneficial or productive options for its use "carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." Id.
162. Id. at 2897.
163. Id (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34
n.30 (1978)).
164. Id. The Court made it clear that "harm-preventing" regulation was no more
likely to be exempt from the Takings Clause than "benefit-conferring" legislation.
The Court commented:
[w]hen it is understood that "prevention of harmful use" was merely our
early formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (with-
out compensation) any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinc-
tion between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers
benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free
basis; it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touch-
stone to distinguish regulatory "takings"-which require compensation-
from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation. A fortiori,
the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis
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The Court recognized only one exception to its rule that "regulation
that deprives land of all economically beneficial use' 1 65 is a compensa-
ble taking: a state may resist compensation only if the owner's prop-
erty was initially subject to the proscribed use.166
Dissenting Justices in Lucas were concerned that the Opinion of the
Court announced a "sweeping" new doctrine. 167 According to Justice
Stevens, Lucas eliminates what he conceived to be the most important
factor the Court had previously considered in determining when gov-
ernmental regulation became a taking-that is, the character of the
governmental action. 68
In its latest takings decision, Dolan v. City of Tigard,169 the Supreme
Court ruled that in adjudicating takings claims, a court must "deter-
mine whether [an] 'essential nexus' exists between a 'legitimate state
interest'" and a governmental restriction or condition.17 0 Further-
more, the Court ruled that if a nexus is found to exist, courts must
"decide the required degree of connection between the exaction and
the projected impact" of the governmental restriction. 17 1 The Court
decided that a "term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates
what [it held] to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment.' 72 It
acknowledged that "no precise mathematical calculation is required,
but [a governmental entity] must make some sort of individualized
determination" that the restriction in question satisfies the propor-
tionality requirement. 73
In summarizing Supreme Court regulatory takings jurisprudence for
the hundred-year period from Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be allowed.
Id. at 2898-99.
165. Id. at 2899.
166. Id. The Court commented that "title" must be "somehow held subject to the
'implied limitation.'" Id. at 2900.
167. Id. at 2917 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun quipped, in his dis-
senting opinion: "[t]oday the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse." Id. at 2904
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He stated:
[m]y fear is that the Court's new policies will spread beyond the narrow
confines of the present case. For that reason, I, like the Court, will give far
greater attention to this case than its narrow scope suggests-not because I
can intercept the Court's missile, or save the targeted mouse, but because I
hope perhaps to limit the collateral damage.
Id.
168. Id. at 2922-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
170. Id. at 2317 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 835
(1987)).
171. Id. The Court commented that the absence of a nexus between an exaction
and the projected impact can "convert[ ] a valid regulation of land use into 'an out-
and-out plan of extortion.'" Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. y. Atkinson, 432 A.2d
12, 14-15 (1981)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2319-20.
States174 to Dolan v. City of Tigard,175 one can extract some guidelines
to aid governmental officials in land-use planning. In 1893, the Court
declared, in Monongahela, that the right to compensation afforded by
the Takings Clause is an incident of the government's power to take
private property, which "reaches back of all constitutional provi-
sions.' 76 The Court asserted in 1960, in Armstrong v. United
States,177 that the Fifth Amendment provides a constitutional "safety
net," which protects private citizens against having to bear public bur-
dens.178 More recently, in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles,179 Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion,180 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,' and Dolan v. City
of Tigard,'" it affirmed the elevated, almost exalted, status it accords
the Takings Clause. These recent rulings, which hold that a taking
occurs when regulation deprives a landowner of all economically ben-
eficial uses of private property or when it "is not reasonably necessary
to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose,' 83 demon-
strate that the Supreme Court presently, as in 1897, in Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago,184 views the Takings
Clause as "an affirmance of a great doctrine established ... for the
protection of private property."' 8 5 Thus, unquestionably, governmen-
tal planners must consider the Takings Clause in all forms of land-use
planning.
In reviewing the Court's opinions, it is evident that the Court has
recognized a distinction between governmental regulation that causes
permanent physical occupation, governmental regulation that is a
physical invasion but causes only temporary occupation, and govern-
mental regulation that only restricts the use of private property.
While the Court has always viewed permanent occupation, and even
temporary physical invasions, as being "of an unusually serious char-
acter,"' 86 the Court has not always required compensation for such
takings if there was a valid exercise of the police power. The Court
had no "rigid per se" regulatory takings rule until 1982 in Loretto v.
174. 148 U.S. 312 (1893). See also supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
175. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994). See also discussion supra notes 169-73 and accompany-
ing text.
176. 148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) (quoting Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 NJ.L. (2 Harr.)
129, 145 (1839)).
177. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
178. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
179. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
180. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
181. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
182. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
183. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)).
184. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
185. Id. at 236 (quoting 2 STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUON OF THE
UNITED STATES *1790). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
186. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
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Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.'8 7 In Loretto, the Court made
the "very narrow" ruling that a permanent physical occupation au-
thorized by government was a taking without regard to the public in-
terest it may serve. 188
With respect to all other regulatory takings, including temporary
physical invasions, the Court has used a balancing test to weigh public
and private interests. 89 The balancing test considered such factors as
fairness, 90 character of governmental action, economic impact, and
interference with investment expectations.' 91 The Court also consid-
ered whether the regulation extinguished any fundamental attributes
of ownership.192
There is authority in several prior Supreme Court rulings for the
conclusion that regulation in the form of a valid exercise of the police
power, when governmental officials are attempting to prohibit uses of
property that are "injurious to the health, morals, or safety of a com-
munity,"'193 does not require compensation even if there is a total dep-
rivation of the property owner's rights.194 But, in light of the majority
opinions in First English and Lucas, which hold that permanent physi-
cal invasions and the denial of all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land, even temporarily, are compensable takings, this
conclusion can no longer be taken for granted.195
In reviewing the majority opinions in First English, Nollan, Lucas,
and Dolan, it is apparent that the Court has now, in fact, established a
"rigid per se" regulatory takings rule for physical governmental occu-
pations of private property, whether temporary or permanent, and re-
gardless of the public purpose. In addition, it is also clear that it has
established a "per se" rule with respect to governmental "use" of pri-
vate property when the owner is deprived of all "economically feasi-
187. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
188. Id. at 441. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
189. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1980).
190. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973).
191. These characteristics were discussed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 470
U.S. 470 (1986). See also supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
192. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
193. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
194. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590
(1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
195. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318
(1987).
ble use" of his or her property.196 However, as the majority conceded
in Lucas, there is uncertainty in applying the per se rule to a govern-
mental use of property. 97 How does one determine when there has
been a total deprivation of private interests? What property interest
becomes the denominator of the fraction, "the burdened portion of
the tract" or "the tract as a whole?' '1
98
As to governmental regulation which limits an owner's use of pri-
vate property, but falls short of total deprivation, the Court would
undoubtedly continue to apply a balancing test. But the test has pre-
sumably changed. Apparently, the Court will no longer consider a
"valid exercise of the police power" as a determining factor. In Do-
lan, the Court ruled that there must be an "essential nexus" between a
"legitimate state interest" and a governmental exaction.199 If the
"nexus" exists, the Court held that a "rough proportionality" test
should be used to determine whether or not an owner is entitled to
compensation.200
Other factors that the Court previously used in applying the balanc-
ing test20' may or may not be considered. According to the majority
in Lucas:
[t]he "total taking" inquiry... will ordinarily entail ... analysis of,
among other things, the degree of harm to public lands and re-
sources, or adjacent private property, posed by the claimant's pro-
posed activities, the social value of the claimant's activities and their
suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease with
which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by
the claimant and the government (or adjacent private landowners)
alike.202
Significantly, if the "character of the governmental action" is no
longer a factor in determining when governmental regulation becomes
a taking,20 3 the elimination of potential future profits by prohibiting
private interests from updating historical properties may be a "total
deprivation" that would be a compensable taking. If so, the Court's
decision in Penn Central may no longer be sound doctrine. A survey
196. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas recognized an exception to this rule,
stating that a government "may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
197. Id. at 2894 n.7.
198. Id. The Lucas Court did not support the calculation in Penn Central in which
the state court "examined the diminution in a particular parcel's value produced by a
municipal ordinance in light of total value of the taking claimant's other holdings in
the vicinity." Id.
199. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2317 (1994). See supra notes 169-73
and accompanying text.
200. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 91-93.
202. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901 (citations omitted).
203. See supra text accompanying note 168.
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of historical preservation regulation is useful in predicting how the
Court will, in the future, address preservation regulation.
II. ARE HISTORICAL PRESERVATION LAWS A "TAKING?" 2 "4
Beginning at the turn of the century, Congress and the states began
to realize that many historically significant properties in the United
States were in jeopardy, and that many others had already been de-
stroyed without considering their historical or cultural value. How-
ever, efforts to preserve and to protect archaeological and
anthropological resources were initially ineffectual because of their
limited scope. At that time, there was little, if any, governmental reg-
ulation of the use of private property. Thus, courts were not required
to determine applicability of the Takings Clause to preservation
regulations.
The later impetus to enact legislation to preserve historical
treasures within domestic boundaries was precipitated by two con-
cerns.2 5 One was the "recognition that ... large numbers of historic
structures, landmarks, and areas ha[d] been destroyed without ade-
quate consideration of either the values represented therein or the
possibility of preserving the destroyed properties for use in economi-
cally productive ways. '206
The second concern was the "widely shared belief that structures
with special historic, cultural; or architectural significance enhance the
quality of life for all."207 The enactment of historical preservation
statutes eventually resulted from a recognition that historical
treasures not only "represent the lessons of the past and embody pre-
cious features of our heritage, they serve as examples of quality for
today. 208
The first congressional attempt to save historic treasures within the
United States was its enactment of the Antiquities Act of 1906.209 The
Act provides penalties for destroying or damaging any historic ruins
on public lands.210 The Antiquities Act was limited in its application,
however, because it subjected persons to penalties for the appropria-
204. Some of the summary material of historical preservation laws was taken from
MARILYN PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW, A GUIDE FOR OFFICERS, DIRECTORS AND
COUNSEL (1994), and MARILYN PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES §§ 16:07 to :08.50,
16:20 to :21 (1985).
205. Penn Cent. TYansp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1978).
206. Id. at 108.
207. Id
208. Id
209. An Act for the Preservation of American Antiquities, Pub. L. No. 59-209,
§§ 1-4, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 433.
tion of a "ruin," "monument," or "object of antiquity," '211 terms which
the Act did not define.212
The Antiquities Act became more effective when Congress enacted
the Historic Sites Act in 1935.213 The Historic Sites Act declared it a
national policy "to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and
objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the
people of the United States. ' 214 The Secretary of the Interior was
given the power to contract, and to enter into cooperative agreements
with the states, municipal subdivisions, and private organizations and
individuals, to protect, preserve, maintain, or operate historic struc-
tures and sites connected with a public use.215 Thus, as late as the
1930s, historical preservation laws were directed toward preserving
historical structures on public property; such laws did not restrict a
citizen's use of private, historical properties.
In 1939, a court first ruled that a government could "take" private
historical property and preserve it for the "public good." In Barnidge
v. United States,216 the Eighth Circuit held that the Secretary of the
Interior could institute condemnation proceedings to acquire private
property that the Secretary determined to possess exceptional value as
a historical site. Regulation of the "use" of such property followed.
In 1949, the National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United
States (the "National Trust") was chartered as a private, nonprofit or-
ganization.217 The National Trust was established "to receive dona-
tions of sites, buildings, and objects significant in United States history
and culture, [and] to preserve and administer them for the public ben-
211. Id.
212. The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-
470mm (1988), built upon the Antiquities Act. It was enacted to protect archaeologi-
cal resources and sites located on public and Native American lands. The Act prohib-
its the sale, purchase, transport, exchange, or receipt of any archaeological resources
removed without permission from public or Indian land. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(a). The
Archaeological Resources Protection Act, which is more explicit in its coverage than
is the Antiquities Act, specifically defines an "archaeological resource" that is pro-
tected under the Act as any material remains of past -human life or activities which is
of archaeological interest and at least 100 years old. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l).
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act was also intended "to foster in-
creased cooperation and exchange of information between governmental authorities,
the professional archaeological community, and private individuals having collections
of archaeological resources." 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b).
213. An Act to Provide for the Preservation of Historic American Sites, Buildings,
Objects, and Antiquities of National Significance, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 74-292, §§ 1-7, 49 Stat. 666 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1988)).
214. 16 U.S.C. § 461.
215. 16 U.S.C. § 462(e).
216. 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939).
217. An Act to Further the Policy Enunciated in the Historic Sites Act (49 Stat.
666) and to Facilitate Public Participation in the Preservation of Sites, Buildings, and
Objects of National Significance or Interest and Providing a National Trust for His-
toric Preservation, Pub. L. No. 81-408, 63 Stat. 927 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 468-468d (1988)).
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efit."118 Recently, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the Na-
tional Trust had standing to maintain actions in courts to prevent the
destruction or alteration of buildings with national historic
significance. 19
For the most part, governmental regulation of the use of private
properties that have historical value began with the National Historic
Preservation Act,22° which was enacted in 1966. The Act provides for
the maintenance and expansion of "a National Register of Historic
Places composed of districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects
significant in United States history, architecture, archaeology, and cul-
ture. ''" 2 In 1980, the Act was amended to provide better guidance for
the National Historic Preservation Program at the federal, state, and
local levels. At that time, Congress asserted that a partnership had
developed between the federal government, the several states, and the
private sector to protect the nation's historic resources. 22
Most historical preservation is accomplished through the states in
cooperation with the federal' government. In the past two decades,
numerous state preservation programs have been initiated, and each
state has established some form of a state preservation agency.22 3 But
an impediment to state historic preservation is the concern that once a
structure is designated as having historic significance, it may not be
altered or destroyed. For example, in Penn Central Transportation Co.
218. 16 U.S.C. § 468.
219. Landmarks Preservation Council v. City of Chicago, 531 N.E.2d 9 (Ill. 1988).
According to the Illinois Court in Landmarks, the National Trust has standing to
maintain actions in state courts to enable it to fulfill its congressionally mandated
functions to prevent the unlawful destruction of buildings that have national historic
significance. Id. at 14.
220. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470w-6 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
221. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(1)(A). The Act requires "the head of any federal agency
having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal, or federally assisted
undertaking in any State... to take into account the effect of the undertaking on any
district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in
the National Register." 16 U.S.C. § 470f. The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988 & Supp. V 1993), requires that environmental
and cultural values be considered along with economic and technological values when
proposed federal projects are assessed. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-32. It provides that the
federal government must "use all practicable means ... to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may
preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage." 42
U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4). If proposed major federal action "significantly affect[s] the qual-
ity of the human environment," the appropriate governmental agency must prepare
an environmental impact statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
222. H.R. Rep. No. 1457, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6378, 6380.
223. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5020-5029 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-147a to 7-147y, §§ 10-321 to 10-321cc (West 1986 &
Supp. 1994); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 9, §§ 26-28 (Law. Co-op. 1988 & Supp. 1994); N.Y.
PARKS REC. & HIsT. PRESERV. LAW § 3.01-.23 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 1995); 37 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-906 (1994).
v. New York City,2 24 the owner of Grand Central Terminal wanted to
demolish a portion of the terminal building and construct an office
tower above it.225 The terminal, one of New York City's most famous
buildings, had been designated a "landmark" pursuant to city law.
When New York City refused to grant permission, Penn Central
brought a lawsuit alleging that the designation restricted the use of
property and diminished its value, thus constituting a "taking." The
Supreme Court did not find a taking, likening New York's Landmarks
Preservation Law to zoning regulations that are "substantially related
to the promotion of the general welfare. ' 22 6 Thus, the Court held that
the diminution in property value caused by application of the preser-
vation law to the owner's property did not constitute a taking.227
In general, courts have not found preservation regulations to
be compensable takings of property. Even prior to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Penn Central, several lower courts rejected the no-
tion that landmark designation constituted a taking. In Maher v. City
of New Orleans,2 28 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
application of a historical preservation ordinance, which prevented an
owner's demolition of a building within a historic district, was not a
taking of the owner's property.229 In Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne
Arundel County,23 ° the Maryland Court of Appeals determined that
application of a city's historical district ordinance, which prevented
the demolition of a historic church, was not a taking.231 In Manhattan
Club v. Landmarks Preservation Commission,232 the New York
Supreme Court ruled that the landmark designation of the former
home of Jennie Jerome, Winston Churchill's mother, was not a taking
of private property.233 However, in Lutheran Church in America v.
City of New York, 3 the New York Court of Appeals found "nothing
short of a naked taking"235 when a landmark preservation ordinance
prevented a church from replacing its obsolete building, finding the
224. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
225. Id. at 116-17.
226. Id. at 138.
227. Id. at 136-37.
228. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976).
229. Id. at 1067.
230. 316 A.2d 807 (Md. 1974).
231. Id. at 808, 822. The congregation consisted of free blacks. The court pointed
out that the church was a "significant symbol of black society and of the accomplish-
ments of free black persons surrounded... by conditions of chattel slavery and racial
discrimination." Id. at 808.
232. 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
233. Id. at 852. The court pointed out that the owner could use the interior of the
building, was guaranteed a reasonable return on its investment, and could make
changes to the property if no plan could be devised to provide such a guarantee. Id.
234. 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974).
235. Id. at 312.
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landmark building "totally inadequate for the [owner's] legitimate
needs.
236
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central, lower courts
have cited that decision as authority that no taking occurs when his-
torical preservation laws restrict the use of privately-owned historical
properties. In Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt,2 37 the First Depart-
ment of New York's Appellate Division ruled that a city's landmarks
law did not constitute a taking as applied to a historical building
owned by a nonprofit, charitable organization. The property owner
had argued that landmark designation stood as a bar against "putting
[its] property to its most lucrative use."'238 However, the First Depart-
ment held that governmental regulation depriving property of its most
beneficial use was not unconstitutional. 39
In Mayes v. City of Dallas,4 ° the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
cited Penn Central in ruling that an owner of a home located within a
historic preservation district could not change the property's exterior
features without obtaining prior approval from the city.241 The court
held that a municipality had "the constitutional power to regulate the
use of private property in the interest of historic preservation.
242
In Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St. Bartholomew's
Church v. City of New York,243 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that a landmarks law "may freeze [church] property in its ex-
isting use and prevent [a] Church from expanding or altering its activi-
ties," stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central
explicitly permitted such restrictions. 244 Finally, in Teachers Insurance
236. Id. The Penn Central Court also recognized the validity of this finding. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 113 n.13 (1978).
237. 415 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
238. Id. at 926.
239. Id.
240. 747 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1984).
241. Id. at 324-26.
242. Id. at 324.
243. 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).
244. Id. at 356. Church members of the historic church wanted to erect a commer-
cial office tower on one of the buildings to expand the church's ministerial and chari-
table activities. Id. at 351.
Members of the church also contended the city's landmarks law violated their free
exercise of religion. The Second Circuit decided that the law did not violate their
First Amendment rights because, according to the court, the members did not prove
that they could not continue their religious practices in the church's existing facilities.
Id. at 352-53.
In First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992),
the Supreme Court of Washington ruled that a city's landmarks preservation ordi-
nance did violate a church's right to free exercise of religion under the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 183, 187. The Court distinguished St Bartholomew's because the church
sought an exception for an adjacent building, not for its house of worship, and be-
cause the Second Circuit did not consider the constitutionality of a liturgy-based reli-
gious exemption. Id. at 181, 189. The First Covenant Church court noted that St.
Bartholomew's had accepted designation as a landmark without objection, whereas
LUCAS
and Annuity Ass'n v. City of New York,245 the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that a landmark designation "must be upheld if it has
support in the record, a reasonable basis in law, and is not arbitrary or
capricious." '246
III. DETERMINING WHETHER PRESERVATION REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTE COMPENSABLE TAKINGS
In essence, the issue currently before preservation planners is
whether they can continue to rely upon Penn Central to resist compen-
sation to private interests when preservation laws substantially limit
the use of landmark property. If the Supreme Court has tipped the
balancing test scales in favor of private interests, then some preserva-
tion regulation, which previously did not require payment to landown-
ers, may now transgress the constitutional limitations imposed by the
Takings Clause. Owners who have sought, or who have accepted
without objection, designation of their property as a landmark may
have waived any takings claims relating to restrictions on the use or
modification of their properties. It can hardly be said that these own-
ers have been singled out unfairly. Furthermore, a general and com-
prehensive preservation program, which affects all property owners in
a certain historical district equally and does not target individual
properties, is less likely to constitute a taking of the property interests
of the individual owners. 247 However, if a preservation regulation to-
tally destroys any future economic or beneficial use of historical
properties, the Supreme Court would undoubtedly rule that such reg-
ulation amounts to a taking.24 The Court in Lucas presumably elimi-
the First Covenant Church had continuously objected to such a designation. Id. at
181. Furthermore, the First Covenant Church claimed the landmark designation re-
duced the value of its principal asset by almost one-half. Id.
245. 623 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1993).
246. Id. at 528. The court stated that a landmarks commission is "presumed to have
developed an expertise" that requires the courts to accept its interpretation of the
law. Id. But the court conceded that "deference" to such a commission "is not re-
quired where the question is one of pure legal interpretation." Id.
247. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131-33 (1978). In
Penn Central, the Court commented that landmark laws that embody a comprehen-
sive plan to preserve structures of historical interest are not discriminatory, like "re-
verse spot" zoning. Id. at 132.
248. The New York Court of Appeals so ruled in Lutheran Church in America v.
City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1974), prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Penn Central.
The Supreme Court asserted in Penn Central that it had, in the past "upheld land-
use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real property inter-
ests." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125. But the query now is whether Penn Central will
dictate future Supreme Court rulings given the Court's opinions in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S.
Ct. 2309 (1994). The majority in Lucas pointed out as "extreme" and "unsupport-
able" the mathematical calculation used'in Penn Central to determine whether the
owner suffered a substantial diminution in value of its property. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2894 n.7.
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nated a consideration of the "character of the governmental
action." '249 Thus, it would seem that, unless property with historical or
cultural significance can be characterized as property having an "ante-
cedent" proscribed use placed upon it,25 0 governmental regulation in
the form of historical preservation would not be given any preferential
status.
For constitutional purposes, the relevant question can no longer be
solely whether governmental preservation regulation has interfered in
some minimal manner with the owner's use of his or her private his-
torical property. An intelligible takings inquiry must ask whether the
extent of the interference is so exacting as to constitute a compensable
taking in light of the owner's alternative uses for the property. In Do-
lan v. City of Tigard,z5 ' the Supreme Court ruled that local govern-
ments and officials must make an "individualized determination" that
a governmental exaction through permit or similar conditions is "re-
lated both in nature and extent to the impact" of the condition and
that there be a "rough proportionality" between any burden placed on
private property and the "benefit" to the public through the exac-
tion.252 There is a question whether the majority opinion in Dolan
would also apply to some, or all, forms of government regulation.253
In addressing this possibility, perhaps local governments and officials
should make such an "individualized determination" respecting the
nature and extent of restrictions placed upon private property through
preservation regulation, and should consider that a substantial dimi-
nution in value of historical .property through restrictions on its use
249. See supra text accompanying note 168.
250. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899. The majority in Lucas concluded that a state
may resist compensation when a regulation has deprived an owner of all economically
beneficial use of his or her property "only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of
his title to begin with." Id. at 2899. But the Court would not agree that, in such an
instance, title "is somehow held subject to [an] 'implied limitation,' " permitting a
state, then, to subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use of the property.
Id. at 2900.
251. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
252. ld at 2319-20. The burden for making such a determination is on the govern-
ment. Id at 2320 n.8. The majority in Dolan also ruled that while a governmental
entity is not required to make a "precise mathematical calculation," it "must make
some effort to quantify its findings" to support its regulation. Id. at 2322.
253. Although Dolan applies to exactions, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in writing the
opinion for the majority, remarked that "simply denominating a governmental mea-
sure as a 'business regulation' does not immunize it from a constitutional challenge on
the grounds that it violates a provision of the Bill of Rights." Id. at 2320. Justice
Rehnquist was responding to Justice Stevens' dissent in which Justice Stevens com-
mented that exactions associated with the development of a business are "a species of
business regulation that heretofore warranted to a strong presumption of constitution
validity." Id. at 2324. In Lucas, the Court seemingly rejected "character of a govern-
mental action" as a factor in takings analysis. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2922-23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). This suggests at least that the Court now views "development exactions"
and governmental regulations in the same light.
may now require compensation to the owner.25 4 Clearly, the Court's
ruling in Penn Central, that a destruction of one "strand" of an
owner's otherwise full "bundle" of rights is not a taking, may no
longer be valid in light of the Court's more recent decision in Lucas.
Another aspect of historical preservation that may produce future
takings claims, centers around the conflict between the nation's muse-
ums and Native Americans in the collection and protection of Native
American artifacts. Native Americans view their culture as being sep-
arate and unique, insisting that their special heritage should be identi-
fied and set apart from the historical heritage of the United States
generally. Thus, Native Americans have asserted an ownership in,
and have demanded repatriation of, Native American artifacts from
museums having such artifacts in their collections.2 5 In 1991, Con-
gress enacted the Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act,256 which now requires museums having possession or control
over collections of Native American funerary and religious objects, to
return such cultural resources, upon request, to the respective Native
American tribe. 7 There undoubtedly will be a takings challenge to
the Act's requirement that museums repatriate artifacts they acquired,
254. Although, given the nationwide concern for the preservation and protection of
historical properties, governmental officials may have little difficulty in demonstrating
Dolan's requisite "rough proportionality" between any burden placed on private his-
torical properties and the "benefit" obtained to the public in preserving and protect-
ing such property. Governmental officials must bear in mind that substantial
diminution in value of private property through material restrictions on its use, im-
posed after an owner's acquisition of the property, may require compensation to the
owner.
The Court in Dolan seemed to reject a "reasonable relationship" test between a
"legitimate state interest" and an exaction as "too lax" a standard. Dolan, 114 S. Ct.
at 2318-19. A majority of the Court presumably views its "rough proportionality" test
as a stricter standard. Id. at 2319. The Court clearly does not approve the "very
generalized statement" some states have used in justifying exactions without
compensation.
If one can legitimately infer from Lucas and Dolan that a majority of the Court
views governmental exactions and governmental regulation as synonymous, its
"rough proportionality" test would be applicable to preservation regulation. Such a
test could render a substantial diminution in the value of private historical or cultural
property, through a substantial restriction on its use, a compensable taking.
255. Native Americans originally cited the American Indian Religious. Freedom
Act, 42 U.S.C § 1996 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as authority for their right to retain their
cultural resources. They contended the Act authorized them to obtain a return of
various Native American religious artifacts that are a part of museum collections. But
the Act does not include a provision that museums must return such artifacts to Na-
tive American tribes. Thus, museums resisted efforts of various tribes to reclaim their
historical treasures.
256. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (Supp. V 1993).
257. Id The Act requires museums to compile an inventory, in consultation with
tribal governments, Native Hawaiian organization officials, and traditional religious
leaders, of all such artifacts and, to the extent possible, based on information muse-
ums possess, to identify the geographical and cultural affiliation of the artifacts. 25
U.S.C. § 3003(a)-(b). Museums must supply documentation of existing records for
the purpose of determining the geographical origin, cultural affiliation, and basic facts
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mostly legally, through purchase or donation. The requirement to re-
patriate is not governmental regulation, but rather a direct appropria-
tion of affected museums' collections.
CONCLUSION
While there remains a lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's appli-
cation of the Takings Clause to governmental regulation of private
property, historical preservationists can discern some principles to
serve as guidelines when they embark on preservation programs. It is
clear that, unless private property was already subject to preservation
restrictions when it was acquired, any physical invasion of private
property through preservation regulation, whether temporary or per-
manent, must now be compensated. But, it would seem that compre-
hensive nondiscriminatory preservation programs, which do not
"specifically or disproportionately burden 2 5  a landowner, would
continue to be, like zoning regulations, "facially constitutional." '259
Still, in applying preservation restrictions to the "use" of private prop-
erty, governmental officials should quantify, through some form of
mathematical calculation, the extent of the burden on private prop-
erty. If the burden is substantial, planners should consider
compensation.
The new constitutional limitations placed upon land-use planners by
recent Supreme Court rulings will unquestionably "lessen the freedom
and flexibility '26" historical preservationists experienced in the past.
But perhaps preservationists may find some redeeming value in the
current posture of the Supreme Court. When governmental officials
become more willing to assess the cost of governmental regulation to
surrounding the acquisition and accession of Native American human remains and
associated funerary objects. Id. at § 3003(b).
258. See Carter v. Helnsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
259. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980). Because comprehensive
preservation programs advance legitimate governmental interests and generally do
not deny the owner's economically viable use of the property, they should not be
compensable takings. But, as in Agins, with respect to zoning regulations, the Court
would likely require a "weighing of private and public interest" to determine whether
property subject to such restrictions has been taken. See supra text accompanying
notes 107-12.
In weighing private and pubic interests, the Court would undoubtedly, as in the
past, require a balancing test. The question is whether the present Court would con-
tinue to apply factors it deemed relevant in its previous decisions (in Lucas, it decided
"character of the governmental action" would no longer be a relevant factor) or
whether it would use a "rough proportionality" test as enunciated in Dolan. The
Court apparently views its rough proportionality test to be a stricter standard. See
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. In either case, as the Court recognized in Lucas, as to
governmental regulation generally, local governments and officials are "offered little
insight" into when preservation regulation has gone "too far" and has become a tak-
ing under the Fifth Amendment. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
260. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987), and supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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private interests, some of the fear associated with having private prop-
erty designated as a historical landmark may be abated. If the present
concern in some circles about the burden placed upon private prop-
erty through preservation regulation is alleviated, private interests
may be more inclined to join the government in its efforts to preserve
historical treasures. Thus, rather than dismantling historical preserva-
tion programs, the Lucas missile could ultimately improve and en-
hance the movement.

